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Complementor Dedication in Platform Ecosystems: Rule Adequacy 
and the Moderating Role of Flexible and Benevolent Practices 
Dedicated complementors are devoted, faithful, and willing to invest in their 
partnership with a platform owner. Because such complementors promise 
continuous value co-creation, complementor dedication is an essential objective 
of platform governance. However, as dedicated complementors also increase 
their vulnerability vis-à-vis a respective platform owner, platform governance 
needs to strike a balance between satisfying global ecosystem needs and local 
individual partnership needs. To better understand this challenge, our study 
develops six hypotheses on how two fundamental governance mechanisms—i.e., 
rules and the way in which these rules are practised—independently and 
symbiotically drive complementor dedication. We test these hypotheses using 
survey data from 181 complementors. Our findings show that complementors 
become more dedicated to a platform owner, the more adequate they perceive the 
rules to be. Our findings suggest two sensible strategies to actualise the potential 
of adequate rules. Platform owners should either entirely refrain from practising 
rules with situational flexibility and benevolence, thereby achieving moderate 
complementor dedication. Alternatively, they should practice rules with both 
flexibility and benevolence at the same time, thereby maximising complementor 
dedication. Our findings contribute to the literature on platform governance and 
broader governance literature. 
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Introduction 
Major software companies like Microsoft, Oracle, or SAP have become platform 
owners that offer their solutions as software platforms (Parker et al., 2016). These 
software platforms describe the extensible codebase of software systems, whose core 
functionality can be complemented by outside companies, so-called complementors, 
through predefined interfaces (Baldwin and Woodard, 2009). Together, a platform 
owner and its complementors form a platform ecosystem (Cusumano and Gawer, 2002). 
A key governance objective of platform owners in such platform ecosystems is 
complementor dedication. Dedicated complementors are important because they are 
devoted and faithful to the platform and willing to invest into the platform partnership, 
thus help generate sustainable add-on value for the platform (Sarker, Xiao, et al., 2012). 
However, dedication harbours risks for complementors, including the risk of 
creating a lock-in situation with platform-specific investments and becoming vulnerable 
vis-à-vis the platform owner (Kude et al., 2012). Platform owners must address these 
risks through adequate governance. This makes governing towards complementor 
dedication challenging because it requires platform owners to govern hundreds or even 
thousands of complementors efficiently while paying close attention to the specific 
needs of individual partnerships (Tiwana et al., 2010; Wareham et al., 2014). In 
traditional inter-organisational arrangements, such as outsourcing partnerships, dyadic 
contracts and relational mechanisms based on close interpersonal relationships would 
help address this challenge (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). However, these conventional 
mechanisms are not readily transferable to platform ecosystems because governance in 
this context is not a dyadic one-to-one problem but a multilateral one-to-many problem. 
Accordingly, platform owners design highly scalable governance mechanisms that 
equally apply to all complementors referred to as rules (Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009). 
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These rules can address specific complementor needs to some extent, for example, by 
differentiating between different partner levels with different rights and duties 
(Wareham, et al., 2014). However, even such complex, stratified rule systems are 
unlikely to fully meet all the varied complementor needs that exist in the ecosystem. To 
overcome these limits, research shows that it is essential to situationally vary how rules 
are practised in particular partnerships (Huber et al., 2017; Wareham, et al., 2014). For 
example, a platform owner may stretch the ecosystem-wide rules in a particular 
situation to provide a complementor with additional resources beyond those stipulated 
in the rules. In return, the complementor may reciprocate by making additional 
investments in its partnership with the platform owner and thus become more dedicated 
(Huber, et al., 2017). Therefore, the objective of this research is to bridge the gap in 
understanding of how the way rules are designed and practised drive complementor 
dedication. More specifically, we ask how do complementor perceptions about the 
adequacy of rules and the way these rules are practised affect complementor dedication 
to a platform owner? 
As a theoretical foundation for answering this research question, we draw upon 
the broader literature on the governance of inter-organisational relationships by 
adapting the concepts of contractual and relational governance to platform ecosystems. 
More specifically, we draw a line from contractual governance to the design of platform 
rules and from relational governance to the practice of rules. Moreover, we pick up the 
discussion on the relationship between contractual and relational governance to theorise 
how the duality of rules and their practice affects complementor dedication. 
Our study makes several contributions to research on platform ecosystems. First, 
our study is the first to provide a fine-grained understanding of the variation in and the 
governance-based drivers of complementor dedication. Although prior research on 
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platform governance has pointed to the high importance of complementor dedication 
(e.g., Economides and Katsamakas, 2006; Huang et al., 2013; Kude, et al., 2012; 
Tiwana, 2015; Zhu and Liu, 2018), it has not yet been treated as a governance objective 
in its own right. Second, our study extends research that has examined either the design 
or practice of rules by considering governance as a dual problem of designing adequate 
rules and skillfully combining these rules with adequate governance practices. By 
finding a significant positive association between rule adequacy and complementor 
dedication as well as a complex three-way interaction between rule adequacy and 
flexible and benevolent rule practices, our study quantitatively underscores that 
platform owners need to (1) take into account the needs of their complementors when 
designing standardised rules and (2) show flexibility and goodwill towards their 
complementors by engaging in dyadic-level variations in rule performances (Foerderer 
et al., 2019; Huber, et al., 2017; Sarker, Sarker, et al., 2012; Wareham, et al., 2014). In 
addition to these contributions to research on platform ecosystems, our study also adds 
to the broader governance literature outside the context of platform ecosystems (Gopal 
and Koka, 2012; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Tiwana, 2009) and in particular the 
longstanding complements versus substitutes debate (Carson et al., 2003; Goo et al., 
2009; Huber et al., 2013; Poppo, 1995; Tiwana, 2010). 
The remainder of this study is organised as follows. First, we adapt classic 
concepts from the inter-organisational governance literature to the context of platform 
ecosystems and then build on this theory contextualisation to develop our hypotheses. 
After that, we describe our research method, followed by the presentation of results and 
the discussion of our findings. We conclude our article by highlighting the 
contributions, implications, and limitations of the study. 
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Theoretical and Conceptual Background 
Platform ecosystems face several unique governance challenges that are grounded in the 
specific relationship between the platform owner and its complementors. To better 
understand these challenges and how they relate to the specific objective of achieving 
complementor dedication, it is informative to draw a line to literature on inter-
organisational relationships in general and to contextualise the concepts from this 
literature in the platform domain (Hong et al., 2014). 
Governance Objective: Complementor Dedication 
In traditional inter-organisational arrangements, such as joint ventures or outsourcing 
partnerships, the central governance objective is to mitigate agency problems related to 
opportunism (Eisenhardt, 1985). In transferring this dominant principal-agent view to 
the platform domain, a peculiarity of platform ecosystems becomes apparent. This 
peculiarity lies in the role of task delegation in the platform owner—complementor-
relationship and the motivation of complementors to continuously invest in partnerships 
with a platform owner. Instead of the platform owner hiring complementors to perform 
a specified task, the complementors decide for themselves how to contribute best to the 
co-creation of value on the platform (Tiwana, et al., 2010). Complementors thus take 
the metaphorical driver’s seat as soon as they have joined an ecosystem: They make 
autonomous decisions on almost all aspects that will determine the fate of the platform 
partnership. For example, complementors determine by themselves what kind of 
software they develop (e.g., a game, a productivity app, or a health app), how much 
effort they invest into development, what characteristics the software should have (e.g., 
its features and qualities), and what innovations to pursue (Boudreau, 2012). 
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In turn, the role of the platform owner is chiefly that of a facilitator that sets the 
rules of the game seeking to ensure that the complementor makes such decisions in a 
way that will differentiate the ecosystem from competing ecosystems in terms of 
innovativeness (Boudreau, 2012; Ozalp et al., 2018; Ye and Kankanhalli, 2018) and 
quality (Cennamo et al., 2018; Cennamo and Santalo, 2013). Such competitive 
differentiation requires complementors to continuously generate platform-specific value 
(Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009; Tiwana, 2013) by intensively exploiting platform and 
ecosystem resources (Foerderer, et al.; Huber, et al., 2017), by maintaining tight-knit 
networks of interpersonal relationships with the platform owner’s personnel (Sarker, 
Xiao, et al., 2012), and by continually acquiring or renewing platform-specific resources 
such as certificates (Kude, et al., 2012). It is these desirable behaviours that platform 
governance strives to foster once complementors have joined an ecosystem. To capture 
these desirable behaviours, we propose the governance objective of dedication, defined 
as the extent to which a complementor is devoted, faithful, and willing to invest in the 
partnership with a platform owner. 
Governance Mechanisms with a Multilateral Scope 
In traditional inter-organisational arrangements, one actor (e.g., the client) regulates and 
adjusts the other actor’s (e.g., the vendor) behaviour by selecting and enacting dyadic-
level contractual and relational governance mechanisms (Goo, et al., 2009; Huber, et al., 
2013). Such dyadic-level mechanisms entail tailored contracts adapted to the specific 
needs of a relationship (Benaroch et al., 2016) and cooperative relational norms, 
including flexibility and benevolence (Ring and van de Ven, 1994). 
In the context of platform ecosystems, governance is not exclusively focused on 
individual, dyadic relationships between one complementor and one platform owner. 
Instead, governance is more multilateral, i.e., focused on the entire ecosystem and the 
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many partnerships between complementors and the platform owner it entails (one-to-
many relationship) (Tiwana, et al., 2010). In other words, the challenge of platform 
owners is that on the one hand they have to govern hundreds or even thousands of 
complementors, and on the other hand they have to pay attention to the needs of 
particular partnerships (see Figure 1) (Huber, et al., 2017; Tiwana, et al., 2010). 
 
Figure 1: Classic dyadic vs multilateral governance 
Rule Adequacy. In platform ecosystems, platform owners heavily rely on 
“scalable” formal governance mechanisms (Tiwana, et al., 2010, p. 676), including 
partner contracts, interface standards, and partner programmes (Huber, et al., 2017; 
Wareham, et al., 2014). We refer to these mechanisms as rules in terms of generalised 
mechanisms that uniformly regulate the behaviours of all complementors in the 
ecosystem (Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009). These rules are usually imposed unilaterally by 
the platform owner on all complementors of their ecosystems (Wareham, et al., 2014). 
Accordingly, prior quantitative research on platform governance has studied optimal 
design choices for standardised interfaces (e.g. open vs closed) and their role in 
producing desirable ecosystem-level outcomes, such as size or innovation (e.g., 
Baldwin and von Hippel, 2011; Boudreau, 2010; Eisenmann et al., 2009). Recent 
qualitative research has shown, however, that the critical challenge is to strike a balance 
between cross-context standardisation for an efficient orchestration of vast ecosystems 
and the consideration to the local needs of individual complementors (Foerderer, et al., 
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2019; Huber, et al., 2017; Wareham, et al., 2014). After all, complementors are 
independent companies whose interests platform owners must consider in their 
standardisation calculus during rule development (Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009; 
Wareham, et al., 2014). To capture this twofold goal, we propose the concept of rule 
adequacy, defined as the extent to which complementors perceive the standardised 
ecosystem-wide rules as securing their own interests as opposed to only securing the 
interests of the platform owner. Rules are more adequate the more effective they are in 
fulfilling three distinct functions, i.e., the protection of complementor resources, the 
prevention of inappropriate platform owner behaviour, and the promise of partnership 
benefits (see Method for details on how these three rule functions that serve as 
dimensions of rule adequacy were developed). 
Across partner dyads, perceptions of rule adequacy will vary for two reasons. 
First, between different ecosystems, rules are designed in different ways (Gulati et al., 
2012) and hence the rules governing an ecosystem may more or less effectively serve 
the protection, prevention, and promise function. For example, the rules of one 
ecosystem can promise more valuable resources to complementors than the rules of 
another ecosystem (Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2013; Wareham, et al., 2014) and they 
can protect such promises with varying legal certainty (Foss and Foss, 2005; 
Williamson, 1985). Second, even if rules are identical—as is the case for 
complementors belonging to the same ecosystem—perceptions of adequacy likely vary 
due to the heterogeneity of complementors with their wide variety of specific needs. In 
light of this variety, complementors will develop their own subjective rule 
understandings (Feldman and Pentland, 2003) based on their specific product and 
service portfolio, resource endowment, and situation (Huang, et al., 2013; Kude, et al., 
2012; Sarker, Xiao, et al., 2012). For example, whereas well-established complementors 
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are likely to appreciate intellectual property protection provided through rules (Huang, 
et al., 2013), complementors new to the ecosystem may place a stronger emphasis on 
access to resources. Similarly, while some resources stipulated by the rules may be 
valuable for certain complementors, they are useless for others (Kude, et al., 2012). 
Thus, even if rules are identical—as is the case for the complementors on the same 
partner level within an ecosystem (Boudreau, 2012)—rule adequacy is likely to vary 
between complementors. Therefore, we will measure rule adequacy perceptually from 
the perspective of the complementors—a previously under-researched perspective 
(McIntyre and Srinivasan, 2017). 
Practising Rules in Platform Ecosystems. Relational mechanisms are generally to a 
lesser extent characterised by explicit prescriptions than contractual mechanisms (Goo, 
et al., 2009; Huber, et al., 2013; Lioliou et al., 2014). However, given the one-to-many 
scope of governance in platform ecosystems, relational governance is not entirely 
independent of contractual governance either (Wareham, et al., 2014). To capture this 
conceptual subtlety, we build on the concept of variations in practising ecosystem-wide 
rules (Huber, et al., 2017), which acknowledges that rules are carried out through 
specific actions by specific people (Foerderer, et al., 2019), at specific times (Huber, et 
al., 2017), and in specific situations (Wareham, et al., 2014). The written rules always 
serve as a basis for these actions, but platform owners still have some leeway to adapt to 
the specifics of the dyad. 
Prior research in the context of platform ecosystems has shown that platform 
owners use their leeway to practice rules with more or less benevolence and flexibility 
(Huber, et al., 2017; Wareham, et al., 2014). Perceived flexibility in practising rules 
describes the extent to which complementors perceive the enactment of ecosystem-wide 
rules by the platform owner as responsive to their needs. This is based on the 
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assumption that rule designers (i.e., platform owners) can interpret rules situationally in 
the light of unforeseen or changing conditions (Boyle et al., 1992; Heide and John, 
1992). For example, platform owners can proactively grant access to partnership 
benefits so that a complementor can take on a specific business opportunity (Wareham, 
et al., 2014). Perceived benevolence in practising rules describes the extent to which 
complementors perceive the enactment of the ecosystem-wide rules by the platform 
owner as kind and generous. This is based on the assumption that rule designers can 
treat the rules in a way that is favourable and beneficial to, as well as in the interest of 
the partnership (McKnight et al., 2002). For example, platform owners can grant 
complementors access to resources that exceed those stipulated by the rules (Huber, et 
al., 2017). Table 2 provides the contextualised definitions of the study’s core constructs. 
Table 2: Core Constructs and Definitions 
Construct Definition Role in Nomology 
Perceived Rule 
Adequacy 
The extent to which complementors perceive the 
ecosystem-wide rules to secure their own interests as 
opposed to only securing the interests of the platform 
owner. 
• Original construct: Child et al. (2003); Gefen and 
Pavlou (2012) 
• Contextualisation basis: Huber, et al. (2017); 
Tiwana, et al. (2010); Wareham, et al. (2014) 
Predictor 
Perceived Flexibility 
in Practising Rules 
The extent to which complementors perceive the 
enactment of ecosystem-wide rules (e.g., rules, codes 
of conduct, or partnership charters) by the platform 
owner as responsive to the complementor’s needs. 
• Original construct: Boyle, et al. (1992); Heide 
and John (1992) 
• Contextualisation basis: Huber, et al. (2017); 
Wareham, et al. (2014) 
Moderator 
Perceived 
Benevolence in 
Practising Rules 
The extent to which complementors perceive the 
enactment of the ecosystem-wide rules (e.g., rules, 
codes of conduct, or partnership charters) by the 
platform owner as kind and generous. 
• Original construct: McKnight, et al. (2002) 
• Contextualisation basis: Huber, et al. (2017); 
Wareham, et al. (2014) 
Moderator 
Complementor 
Dedication  
The extent to which a complementor is devoted, 
faithful, and willing to invest in the partnership with a 
platform owner 
• Original construct: Anderson (1985); Heide and 
John (1992) 
• Contextualisation basis: Tiwana (2015) 
Dependent Variable  
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Hypotheses Development 
Our hypotheses about the independent and symbiotic effects of rule adequacy and rule 
practice perceptions build on one central theoretical argument: to successfully foster 
complementor dedication, platform governance needs to strike a balance between 
satisfying the global needs of the entire ecosystem and the local needs of individual 
partnerships. We argue that to address this challenge, platform owners will use two 
mechanisms, i.e., they will design rules, and they practice these rules with flexibility 
and benevolence. However, to maximise dedication, platform owners need to combine 
these two mechanisms symbiotically. Figure 2 visualises our research model. 
 
Figure 2: Research Model 
The Direct Effect of Perceived Rule Adequacy 
The one-to-many nature of platform ecosystems implies resource asymmetries between 
platform owners and complementors (Kude, et al., 2012). Platform owners, on the one 
hand, make investments with the goal to create and maintain resources that are valuable 
for many, if not all, complementors of their ecosystems (Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009; 
Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2013; Kude, et al., 2012; Wareham, et al., 2014). These 
ecosystem resources include the software platform, development suites, code 
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repositories, and marketing tools (Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2013; Kude, et al., 
2012; Wareham, et al., 2014). Complementors, by contrast, make platform-specific 
investments, i.e., they create, maintain, and develop resources that cannot be easily 
transferred to another partnership, because they are significantly more valuable in a 
particular partnership than outside of it (Dyer and Singh, 1998). For example, 
complementors acquire platform-specific knowledge and certifications or engage with 
the staff of the platform owner (Kude, et al., 2012; Wareham, et al., 2014). 
Against this backdrop, the platform owner is less dependent on individual 
complementors, but rather on the ecosystem as a whole, while complementors depend 
heavily on their respective platform owner (Huber, et al., 2017; Kude, et al., 2012). This 
means that a platform owner only requires minor benefits accruing from individual 
partnerships and, at the same time, faces only minor threats from opportunistic 
behaviour on the part of individual complementors. In contrast, a complementor needs 
to capitalise on its partnership to pay off its investments, while facing considerable 
threats of losing these investments through opportunistic behaviour on the part of a 
platform owner (Kude, et al., 2012). This contrast creates a twisted governance 
challenge for platform owners (Tiwana, et al., 2010). Different from traditional inter-
organisational settings, the protection of investments is only a tangential goal—what 
platform owners are interested in is the value co-created by the complementor, which 
directly depends on complementor dedication. Ironically, to incite such dedication, 
platform owners need to protect the interests and investments of the complementors. 
Otherwise, complementors might consider the threat of opportunism as too high and 
therefore refrain from making additional platform-specific investments and intensifying 
their engagement (Williamson, 1985). Rules must therefore strengthen the confidence 
of complementors, for example by making believable promises that they will receive 
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valuable partner benefits—such as access to technical and non-technical (Ghazawneh 
and Henfridsson, 2013; Wareham, et al., 2014), tangible and intangible (Kude, et al., 
2012) ecosystem resources. The more effectively rules protect a complementor’s 
resources, the more effectively they prevent inappropriate platform owner behaviour, 
and the more valuable complementors perceive the promised resources, the more 
optimistic complementors will be about their current and future investments in the 
platform. Hence, we hypothesise: 
H1: Higher perceived rule adequacy is associated with higher complementor 
dedication. 
The Direct Effects of Flexible and Benevolent Practices 
The highly standardised nature of rules comes at a price: because rules are standardised 
they can neither be sensitive to all local needs of individual complementors (Sarker, 
Xiao, et al., 2012; Wareham, et al., 2014) nor can they anticipate and respond to every 
future eventuality (Huber, et al., 2017). Thus, even though rules may be strong in 
economising on governance costs (due to standardisation) and in safeguarding 
complementors from behavioural uncertainty, rules alone are limited in their ability to 
address problems related to high heterogeneity and environmental uncertainty 
(Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997; Williamson, 1985). Research on traditional inter-
organisational arrangements has shown that managers add other types of governance 
mechanisms (such as relational governance), which have unique strengths that can 
compensate the limitations of rules (Goo, et al., 2009; Huber, et al., 2013; Poppo and 
Zenger, 2002). 
In the context of platform ecosystems, these other types of governance 
mechanisms manifest themselves as variations in practising ecosystem-wide rules as 
embodied in the constructs of flexible and benevolent rule practices. Such flexible and 
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benevolent practices are stronger than rules in addressing the local and changing needs 
of individual complementors (Huber, et al., 2017). Hence, when rules reach their limits, 
platform owners may situationally show variations in practising them to address the 
complementors’ local needs effectively (Huber, et al., 2017; Sarker, Xiao, et al., 2012; 
Wareham, et al., 2014). Consider a complementor in an environment with rapidly 
changing customer needs that face an unexpected business opportunity. To exploit it, 
the complementor is likely to engage in synergistic co-creation with the platform owner 
to develop highly innovative solutions to novel or idiosyncratic problems (Sarker, Xiao, 
et al., 2012). This requires (1) that the platform owner is highly adaptive to the specific, 
situational needs of the complementor and (2) that the complementor is willing to 
intensify the partnership and invest even more into it (Sarker, et al., 2012). We argue 
that the first condition will shape the second. More specifically, by practising rules with 
flexibility or benevolence, platform owners can maintain responsive despite the 
adaptive limits of rules. For example, the platform owner may assist the complementor 
beyond the stipulated support by granting access to particularly scarce ecosystem 
resources (benevolence) or by granting access to these resources at just the right time 
and situation (flexibility). Such rule practices could increase the willingness of 
complementors to take the risk of intensifying their partnerships and making additional 
investments. Therefore, we hypothesise: 
H2a: Higher perceived flexibility in practising rules is associated with higher 
complementor dedication. 
H2b: Higher perceived benevolence in practising rules is associated with higher 
complementor dedication. 
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The Moderating Effects of Flexible and Benevolent Practices 
Even though platform owners have leeway as to how they practice governance in 
specific situations and partnerships, these governance practices are usually not detached 
from the ecosystem-wide rules either—instead, when platform owners show practice 
variations, the rules still serve as an essential reference point (Huber, et al., 2017). This 
points to symbiotic interactions between rule adequacy and rule practices, similar to 
those discussed in the broader governance literature under the umbrella of 
complementarity between contractual and relational mechanisms (Huber, et al., 2013; 
Poppo and Zenger, 2002). According to this research, complementarity between 
governance mechanisms occurs when one mechanism helps to better leverage the 
strengths of the other mechanism (Huber, et al., 2013; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). 
Applied to the platform ecosystem context, this means that rule practices would help 
better leverage the strengths of adequate rules, and vice versa. When platform owners 
practice rules with benevolence or flexibility, there continues to be a close link to the 
rules. More specifically, platform owners are looking for smart ways to repurpose 
existing rules, rather than informally finding solutions that are independent of the rules 
(Huber, et al., 2017). Importantly, more adequate rules are likely to offer more 
opportunities for such clever repurposing as less adequate ones. Accordingly, we expect 
that flexible and benevolent rule practices will strengthen the effect of perceived rule 
adequacy on complementors’ dedication, as they help to leverage and actualise the 
potential benefits of rules fully. Therefore, we hypothesise: 
H3a: The positive relationship between perceived rule adequacy and complementor 
dedication is stronger when rule practices are perceived as more benevolent. 
H3b: The positive relationship between perceived rule adequacy and complementor 
dedication is stronger when rule practices are perceived as more flexible. 
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Moreover, we expect that adequate rules contribute most strongly to 
complementor dedication if rule practices are simultaneously benevolent and flexible. 
Two arguments favour such a more sophisticated (three-way) interaction: First, if 
practices are flexible but not benevolent, platform owners react at the right time, but not 
with the right resources. This circumstance will undermine the complementor’s ability 
to respond to unforeseen circumstances effectively. Therefore, the complementor will 
be less prone to make additional platform-specific investments and less faithful to the 
platform. Likewise, if practices are benevolent but not flexible, platform owners react 
with valuable resources but not at the right time. Again, this will undermine the 
complementor’s ability to leverage the business opportunities entailed in unforeseen 
circumstances fully. In return, the complementor may suspend additional platform-
specific investments and be less faithful to the platform owner. Thus, rule practices will 
only fully actualise the potential of rules if they are both benevolent and flexible. For 
example, if a complementor receives just the right resources at just the right time. 
Second, if a platform owner flexibly adapts governance practices to 
accommodate the needs of a complementor, the platform owner needs to comply with 
the broader relational values of the ecosystem, such as benevolence (Gulati, et al., 2012; 
Tiwana, et al., 2010). Otherwise, highly flexible governance practices can make the 
platform owner look like an arbitrary despot (Huber, et al., 2017). If the platform owner 
leaves such a negative impression, it may lead to increased uncertainty on the part of the 
complementors, paralysing their dedication. Thus, the potential of the ecosystem rules 
only actualises completely if rule practices are simultaneously flexible and benevolent. 
Therefore, we hypothesise: 
H3c: The positive relationship between perceived rule adequacy and complementor 
dedication will be strongest when the rule practices are perceived both highly 
benevolent and highly flexible (as opposed to either or both low). 
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Method 
We conducted a survey among complementors in platform ecosystems to test our 
hypotheses. In the following, we outline our data gathering, measurement and analysis 
procedures and our results. 
Data Collection 
Data was collected through an online survey of companies operating in the software 
industry (software companies) as part of a larger research project. Our target population 
were those software companies that currently act as complementors in platform 
ecosystems. To prevent confounding by cross-national differences, such as cultural and 
legal norms, we conducted our study in a single European country (Switzerland). To 
ensure the highest possible coverage of software companies in Switzerland, we drew on 
a commercial contact database. 
Additionally, we matched the contacts from the commercial database with the 
available contact databases of multiple industry associations in Switzerland as well as 
with the contact database of a leading Swiss IT consulting company to double-check for 
a comprehensive list. Then we screened every single contact to verify each company’s 
existence and relation to the broader software industry. The overall contact screening 
took place in the summer and fall of 2014. From initially about 15,000 contacts, 4,955 
hand-sorted contacts remained in the database. 
Data collection was initiated in May 2015 using a commercial online survey tool 
(Qualtrics). Invitations for the survey were sent out by email to senior members of the 
companies. Six hundred thirty-two surveys were completed (12.75% response rate). To 
identify the complementors among these 632 companies, we asked whether they were 
collaborating with a platform owner. For this purpose, we defined our understanding of 
a software platform: “Under software partner, we understand legally independent 
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companies which develop own software based on a software platform [e.g. extension of 
SAP R/3], or configure an existing platform [e.g. parameterisation of SAP ERP in 
customer projects], and are members of the partner programme of the corresponding 
platform owner”. From the 632 companies, 196 indicated to be in a relationship with a 
platform owner. These 196 companies were then asked questions about their 
relationship with their most important platform owner. 
We screened the responses of the 196 companies that indicated to be in a 
relationship with a platform owner using the recommendations by Hair et al. (2006). We 
dropped 15 responses because they were either unengaged or showed missing values in 
more than 10% of the survey items (Hair, et al., 2006, p. 36). The data screening 
resulted in our final sample of 181 complete survey responses. 
Appendix B and Table 6 show the characteristics of our final sample. Most 
complementors (76) indicated that Microsoft was their most important platform owner, 
followed by IBM (11), Apple (11), and SAP (10). Since Microsoft’s desktop operating 
systems (e.g. Windows 10 and Windows 7) dominate the market for desktop operating 
systems, complementors might have mentioned Microsoft because they had hardly any 
option but to develop their software for Microsoft desktop operating systems. However, 
according to the information that 75 of the 76 Microsoft complementors provided in a 
free-text field, 69 (92%) mentioned software platforms other than Microsoft desktop 
operating system, including Microsoft Dynamics, Sharepoint, Azure,.Net, and 
Microsoft SQL. Hence, the vast majority of the Microsoft complementors extended or 
configured a software other than Microsoft desktop operating systems. 
Measurement Contextualisation 
The contextualisation procedure of the study’s core constructs (i.e., perceived rule 
adequacy, perceived flexibility in practising rules, perceived benevolence in practising 
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rules, and complementor dedication1) followed the multi-step recommendations of 
MacKenzie et al. (2011). The first step involved a literature review of the broader 
governance literature, which led to the identification of constructs, such as rules, 
flexibility, benevolence, and dedication. Since these constructs were initially developed 
in other contexts, the second step focused on developing an understanding of how 
governance is different in the context of platform ecosystems (Huang, et al., 2013). For 
this purpose, we content-analysed two sets of documents: (1) the academic literature on 
platform governance (see ‘Literature Review and Contextualisation’ for more details) 
and (2) the documents in which the rules of ecosystems are formalised. The latter 
document corpus entailed partner contracts, partner guides, and codes of conduct from 
major platform owners operating in Switzerland (i.e., Microsoft, SAP, IBM, Oracle, 
Google, Salesforce, Apple, and Adobe), resulting in 558 pages of analysed documents. 
We used these documents to arrive at a rich and contextualised understanding of the 
mechanisms through which rules may help secure the complementors’ interests, 
resulting in our classification of three rule functions (protect, prevent, and promise). 
These three rule functions served as the basis for the three items of your rule adequacy 
construct (see Appendix D for detailed examples of these functions). 
In a third step, after having gained an understanding of the nature of governance 
in platform ecosystems, we began to collaboratively adapt the original constructs from 
the broader governance literature to our context. While doing so, we placed great 
 
1 Dedication is conceptualized as an organisation-level construct instead of an individual-level construct. 
Similar to inter-organizational trust research, we therefore collect data at the organizational level by 
surveying the key individuals “through whom inter-firm relations come into effect” (Janowicz and 
Noorderhaven, 2006, p. 277). This approach is particularly appropriate in the context of our study, as 
partnership managers play an even more important role in software ecosystems than normal boundary 
spanners in traditional inter-organisational arrangements (Kude, et al., 2012; Sarker, Sarker, et al., 2012). 
The reason for this is that after a partnership is formed, only one (as opposed to several) dedicated 
boundary spanner of the platform owner is responsible for interaction with the complementor, while 
complementors, due to their limited size, usually also assign only one individual as boundary spanner. 
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emphasis on maintaining their original intentions. In a fourth step, we invited three 
experienced practitioners from complementor companies, and four senior IS scholars to 
review our constructs to assess and ensure the content validity of the resulting items. To 
that end, we asked both the scholars and the practitioners to provide feedback and to 
rate the extent to which each item captures each aspect of the construct domain (i.e. 
construct definition) using five-point Likert scales (Hinkin and Tracey, 1999). We used 
the information gleaned from this construct review to refine our items. In a fifth step, 
we formally specified the measurement model to conduct a pre-test in a culturally 
similar country (Austria). Based on an exploratory factor analysis of the collected data, 
we decided to use the constructs for our actual survey. Each of the final constructs used 
a five-point Likert scale and is listed in Table 2 with definitions, and references to both 
the original governance literature and the contextualisation literature. Appendix A 
provides further information regarding our constructs. 
To identify relevant control variables, we reviewed prior qualitative and 
quantitative research on platform ecosystems and related fields. This led to the inclusion 
of the following seven control variables: age of the relationship, partner manager, 
complementor size, (seller-level) multi-homing, software integrator, same layer, and 
dependence. The control variables were crucial, not only to control for omitted variables 
but also to account for the complementors’ self-selection into a platform (Antonakis et 
al., 2014; Heckman, 1979). For example, dependence may explain platform choice (i.e., 
self-selection into a platform) given that complementors who are highly dependent on 
their platform owner may choose to stay in a platform even under unfavourable 
governance (e.g., low perceived rule adequacy). Appendix A provides detailed 
information on the control variables, including arguments for their relevance (e.g., how 
the control variable helps to account for self-selection). 
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Instrument Validation 
To confirm the factor structure (Gefen and Straub, 2005), we performed a confirmatory 
factor analysis (Hair, et al., 2006; Muthén and Muthén, 2002) based on the final sample 
(n=181) using IBM SPSS AMOS. Standardised Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) 
below 0.8 and a comparative fit index (CFI) above 0.95 indicated goodness-of-fit, 
Composite Reliability (CR) values well above 0.7 indicated good or even excellent 
reliability (Hong, et al., 2014), and Average Variance Extracted (AVE) values well 
above 0.5 speak for strong convergent validity (see Table 3). 
Table 3: Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results 
Construct Indicators 
Item Loading 
(T-Values) 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha (α) 
CR AVE 
Perceived Rule Adequacy  0.85 0.91 0.77 
RuleAdeq_1 0.92 (43.445**)    
RuleAdeq_2 0.92 (47.580**)    
RuleAdeq_3 0.79 (16.416**)    
Perceived Benevolence in 
Practising Rules 
 0.90 0.94 0.83 
BenePrac_1 0.91 (46.04***)    
BenePrac_2 0.93 (32.54***)    
BenePrac_3 0.89 (17.79***)    
Perceived Flexibility in 
Practising Rules 
 0.89 0.93 0.81 
FlexPrac_1 0.94 (15.16***)    
FlexPrac_2 0.94 (16.72***)    
FlexPrac_3 0.83 (6.63***)    
Perceived Dependence  0.85 0.90 0.68 
Dep_1 0.82 (4.49***)    
Dep_2 0.75 (3.80***)    
Dep_3 0.89 (5.62***)    
Dep_4 0.83 (17.77***)    
Complementor Dedication  0.89 0.92 0.75 
Ded_1 0.87 (33.07***)    
Ded_2 0.92 (55.39***)    
Ded_3 0.91 (36.25***)    
Ded_4 0.75 (14.85***)    
***p<.01 
 
To corroborate discriminant validity, we first scrutinised whether each item 
loaded higher on its construct than on any other construct (Gefen and Straub, 2005). For 
each item, the difference between the loading of the item on its construct and the cross-
loadings of the item on any other construct was well above 0.2. Second, the square roots 
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of the AVE values exceeded correlations between latent constructs. Specifically, the 
square root of the lowest AVE value (.68) was well above the highest correlation 
between the two latent constructs (.50) (see Table 4) (Gefen and Straub, 2005). 
Table 4: Discriminant Validity: Inter-Construct Correlations (Bold: Square Roots of 
AVE) 
  1 2 3 4 5 
1 Perceived Rule Adequacy 0.77     
2 Perceived Benevolence in Practising Rules 0.50 0.83    
3 Perceived Flexibility in Practising Rules 0.20 0.36 0.81   
4 Perceived Dependence -0.15 -0.12 -0.12 0.68  
5 Complementor Dedication 0.37 0.36 0.19 0.14 0.75 
 
Given our reliance on a single instrument for gathering our data, common 
method bias is a potential threat to validity (Podsakoff et al., 2003). However, it has 
been shown that tests of interaction effects, which are at the heart of our article, are not 
threatened by common method bias (Siemsen et al., 2010). To examine the potential 
role of common method bias in testing the hypothesised main effect (i.e., H1), we 
applied the full collinearity variance inflation factors (VIF) technique, which was 
suggested by Kock (2009) and Kock and Lynn (2012).2 For this purpose, we created a 
dummy variable based on random values from 0 to 1 on which we pointed at every 
construct of our model. Common method bias is indicated when the VIF is higher than 
an accepted conservative threshold of 3.3 (Kock, 2009). None of the VIF values was 
higher than 3.3 (with a range from 1.04 to 1.42), indicating that common method bias 
did not confound our results. 
 
2 There is some disagreement among scholars regarding the likelihood and nature of common method 
bias as calculated with the correlation marker technique, the confirmatory factor analysis marker 
technique, or the unmeasured latent method construct technique (Chin et al., 2012; Richardson et al., 
2009). The full collinearity VIF technique has recently been suggested as a new technique that may 
overcome the limitations of alternative approaches. 
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Regression Approach 
We tested our model by estimating regression models augmented with Heckman 
correction and cluster-robust standard errors. Heckman correction is a method 
specifically designed for tackling potential endogeneity due to self-selection (Heckman, 
1979). More specifically, there is the possibility that complementors choose their 
primary platform based on unobserved factors that correlate with dedication and with 
the predictors of dedication in our model, which would result in biased, inconsistent 
estimates (Heckman, 1979). Heckman correction accounts for the potentially 
endogenous choice of platforms and removes such endogeneity by controlling for the 
likelihood of selecting a particular platform. 
Heckman correction required building a selection model that predicts the 
likelihood of selecting a particular platform as well as a treatment model that controls 
for the likelihood of selection and thereby provides consistent estimates of the 
hypothesised effects. We built the selection model to predict the choice of Microsoft as 
the platform owner given that Microsoft was by far the most frequently selected 
platform in our sample (see also Appendix B). Selection models should include all 
predictors of the treatment model and exclusion restrictions, i.e., exogenous variables 
that help predict the selection variable (i.e., choice of Microsoft) but do not correlate 
with the dependent variable (i.e., dedication) (Clougherty et al., 2016). Table 5 shows 
the chosen exclusion restrictions. We used Specific Sector and Public Administration as 
exclusion restrictions, given that Microsoft had a strong focus on platforms addressing 
the needs of particular industries, such as Microsoft Dynamics for the public sector. 
Hence, complementors specialised in the needs of particular sectors were expected to be 
more likely to choose Microsoft as opposed to other platforms. At the same time, we 
were not aware of arguments leading us to expect that specialisation in the needs of a 
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particular industry should correlate with dedication. We also empirically verified this 
(p>.1 for bi-variate correlations). In a similar vein, we used Enterprise Content 
Management as an exclusion restriction because of the strong position of Microsoft 
Sharepoint in the Swiss Market. We verified that Enterprise Content Management did 
not correlate significantly with dedication (p>.1). 
Table 5: Exclusion restrictions 
Variable Measurement 
Industry: Specific Sector 
1 if the complementor addresses the requirements of a 
particular sector; 0 otherwise 
Industry: Public Administration 
1 if the complementor addresses the needs of public 
sector organisations; 0 otherwise 
Product: Enterprise Content Management 
1 if the complementor develops or implements enterprise 
content management solutions; 0 otherwise 
 
Our regression approach also relied on cluster-robust standard errors, given the 
possibility that observations related to the same platform owner (i.e., the same cluster) 
could correlate. Such correlations would violate the regression assumption of 
independent error terms. Cluster-robust standard errors account for these correlations by 
adjusting the confidence intervals of the regression coefficients. We performed our 
analysis using the etregress command in Stata version 15 with maximum likelihood 
estimation, which allowed the use of cluster-robust standard errors. 
To test our hypotheses, we built upon a four-step hierarchical regression strategy 
(see Table 8). In the first step, we included all control variables (Model 1). In the second 
step, we added all the main effects of the hypothesised predictors (Model 2). In the third 
step, we added all two-way interactions (Model 3), and in the fourth step, the 
hypothesised three-way interaction effect (Model 4). We verified that the residuals of all 
models followed normal distributions. Moreover, we verified that VIF were below 10 
(highest value: 1.61), indicating thus no concerns with multicollinearity. 
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To explore the role that the high fraction of Microsoft complementors played in 
our results, we performed a post-hoc analysis in which we removed the Microsoft 
complementors from the sample. We used a Heckman selection model (Stata command 
Heckman) to estimate this regression model. 
Results 
Regression Results 
Table 6 provides descriptive statistics (additional descriptive statistics are provided in 
Appendix B), Table 7 shows the correlation matrix, and the regression results are 
presented in Table 8. The first column of Table 8 shows the results related to the control 
variables (Model 1). In our treatment model, software integrator (ß=0.30, p<0.01), 
partner manager (ß=0.61, p<0.001), and dependence (ß=0.24, p<0.001) were significant 
positive predictors of complementor dedication. Moreover, Microsoft was a significant, 
negative predictor (ß=-.70, p<0.01). The other control variables were statistically 
insignificant. The selection model shows that all exclusion restrictions (specific sector, 
public administration, enterprise cloud management) were significant, supporting their 
suitability for identifying platform selection. The Wald test of independent equations 
was significant (p<.05), suggesting that self-selection of Microsoft does indeed produce 
endogeneity (which the model corrects for). 
The second column (Model 2) shows the main effects of the three predictors of 
our theoretical model. H1 predicted a positive relationship between perceived rule 
adequacy and complementor dedication. In support of H1, the results show a significant 
positive association (ß=0.26, p<0.01). The main effect of perceived flexibility was 
negative and not significant (ß=-.06, p>0.05). The main effect of perceived benevolence 
was positive and not significant (ß=0.24, p>0.05). Thus, H2a and H2b are not 
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supported. The log likelihood ratio test shows that model 2 is preferable over model 1 
(p<.001), showing that our independent variables explain significant variance in 
complementor dedication beyond of what is explained by control variables such as 
dependence and partner manager. 
The third column (Model 3) includes the two-way interaction effects, which 
allowed testing H3a and H3b. H3a and H3b predicted that the relationship between rule 
adequacy and complementor dedication is stronger when rules are practised with a 
higher degree of benevolence (H3a) and flexibility (H3b), respectively. Model 3 shows 
insignificant two-way interactions between rule adequacy and benevolence (ß=.05, 
p>0.05) and between rule adequacy and flexibility (ß=-.05, p>0.05)—providing no 
support for H3a and H3b. 
The fourth column (Model 4) includes the three-way interaction effect, which 
allowed testing H3c. H3c predicted that the relationship between perceived rule 
adequacy and complementor dedication is strongest when both perceived benevolence 
and perceived flexibility in practising rules are high. Model 4 shows a significant 
positive three-way interaction (ß=0.09, p<0.001). Moreover, the log likelihood ratio test 
shows that model 4 is preferable over model 3 (p<.01). Overall, this provides support 
for the three-way interaction hypothesised in H3c. 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics 
  Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. 
1 Complementor Dedication 1 5 3.4 0.91 
2 Perceived Rule Adequacy 1 5 3.37 0.89 
3 Perceived Flexibility in Practising Rules 1 5 2.99 0.91 
4 Perceived Benevolence in Practising Rules 1 5 3.28 0.78 
5 No. of Employees (Full Time Equivalents) 0.15 400 25.08 56.06 
6 Multi-homing 0 1 0.51 0.5 
7 Software Integrator 0 1 0.45 0.5 
8 Partner Manager 0 1 0.55 0.5 
9 Relationship Age 0 40 11.12 7.79 
10 Same Layer 0 1 0.53 0.5 
11 Perceived Dependence 1 5 3.07 1.06 
12 Microsoft 0 1 0.42 0.49 
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Table 7: Correlation Matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Complementor Dedication 1.00 .37** .18* .36** .10 .07 .17* .39** -.10 .21** .13 -.07 
2 Perceived Rule Adequacy .37** 1.00 .20** .49** -.02 .06 .10 .23** -.07 -.01 -.15* .03 
3 
Perceived Flexibility in 
Practising Rules 
.18* .20** 1.00 .35** .07 .01 .13 .21** -.06 .16* -.12 -.17* 
4 
Perceived Benevolence in 
Practising Rules 
.36** .49** .35** 1.00 .00 .07 .16* .19* -.12 -.05 -.12 .04 
5 No. of Employees .10 -.02 .07 .00 1.00 .09 .03 .29** .13 .18* -.12 -.03 
6 Multi-homing .07 .06 .01 .07 .09 1.00 .11 .07 .02 .01 -.29** -.29** 
7 Software Integrator .17* .10 .13 .16* .03 .11 1.00 .05 .04 .14 .00 .01 
8 Partner Manager .39** .23** .21** .19* .29** .07 .05 1.00 -.11 .12 -.05 -.17* 
9 Relationship Age -.10 -.07 -.06 -.12 .13 .02 .04 -.11 1.00 .02 .15* .06 
10 Same Layer .21** -.01 .16* -.05 .18* .01 .14 .12 .02 1.00 .00 -.05 
11 Perceived Dependence .13 -.15* -.12 -.12 -.12 -.29** .00 -.05 .15* .00 1.00 .24** 
12 Microsoft -.07 .03 -.17* .04 -.03 -.29** .01 -.17* .06 -.05 .24** 1.00 
n = 181 *p <.05, **p <.01 
Table 8: Regression Results 
 
Model 1 
Controls Only 
Model 2 
+ Main Effects 
Model 3 
+ Two-way 
Interaction Effects 
Model 4 
+Three-way 
Interaction Effects 
Treatment Model     
Intercept -.31 (.20) -.23 (.17) -.31 (.20) -.28 (.18) 
No. of Employees .01 (.06) .05 (.06) .05 (.06) .06 (.06) 
Multi-homing .01 (.08) .00 (.11) .02 (.11) .02 (.12) 
Softw. Integrator .30** (.10) .18* (.07) .16 (.09) .17* (.08) 
Partner Manager .61*** (.13) .42*** (.10) .43*** (.10) .44*** (.09) 
Relationship age -.09 (.10) -.06 (.09) -.06 (.08) -.04 (.08) 
Same Layer .26 (.16) .34*** (.08) .34*** (.08) .29*** (.08) 
Dependence .24*** (.05) .29*** (.04) .28*** (.05) .31*** (.05) 
Microsoft -.70** (.33) -.63* (.27) -.52 (.32) -.58 (.33) 
Rule Adequacy - .26** (.09) .26** (.08) .22** (.07) 
Flexibility - -.06 (.07) -.05 (.07) -.10 (.08) 
Benevolence - .24 (.13) .23 (.13) .19 (.11) 
Rule Adequacy × Flexibility - - .05 (.05) .00 (.04) 
Rule Adequacy × 
Benevolence 
- - .05 (.04) .06* (.03) 
Flexibility × Benevolence - - -.04 (.07) .00 (.07) 
Rule Adequacy × Flexibility 
× Benevolence 
- -  .09*** (.02) 
Selection Model     
Intercept -.03 (.71) -.03 (.68) .05 (.70) .04 (.69) 
Specific Sector .49*** (.09) .53*** (.10) .53*** (.12) .54*** (.12) 
Public Administration .38*** (.09) .40*** (.11) .43*** (.12) .42*** (.12) 
Enterprise Content 
Management 
.35* (.17) .35* (.16) .28 (.16) .29 (.16) 
No. of Employees .02 (.08) .04 (.09) .04 (.07) .04 (.07) 
Multi-homing -.72*** (.16) -.79*** (.14) -.74*** (.13) -.74*** (.13) 
Softw. Integrator .12 (.16) .12 (.15) .12 (.13) .11 (.14) 
Partner Manager -.47*** (.12) -.55*** (.15) -.57*** (.15) -.57*** (.14) 
Relationship age .00 (.15) .00 (.14) -.02 (.15) .00 (.14) 
Same Layer -.06 (.11) .05 (.12) .01 (.12) .00 (.13) 
Dependence .24** (.09) .25** (.09) .25** (.09) .26* (.10) 
Rule Adequacy - .15* (.06) .14* (.06) .13* (.05) 
Flexibility - -.27* (.10) -.29* (12) -.30* (.12) 
Benevolence - .18 (.09) .20** (.07) .19** (.07) 
Rule Adequacy × Flexibility - - -.15** (.05) -.15* (.06) 
Rule Adequacy × 
Benevolence 
- - -.02 (.04) -.02 (.03) 
Flexibility × Benevolence - - -.06 (.08) -.05 (.08) 
Rule Adequacy × Flexibility 
× Benevolence 
- - - .02 (.05) 
Log likelihood -337.21 -316.08 -311.96 -.308.21 
2 * Log likelihood 
difference (df) 
- 42.26*** (3) 8.24* (1) 7.48** (1) 
Wald test of independent 
equations: Chi-squared 
4.87* 5.54* 2.34 2.47 
*p <.05, **p <.01, ***p <.001, n = 181, Heckman regression with cluster-robust standard errors (cluster: platform owner), all 
non-binary variables standardised 
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Model Robustness 
We assessed the robustness of our findings by examining alternative model 
specifications. To assess the potential threat that interaction effects can be artefacts of 
quadratic effects (Carte and Russell, 2003), we added the quadratic effects of our 
hypothesised predictors. None of the quadratic effects was significant, and their 
inclusion did not change the statistical significance level of any relationship (not 
tabulated). We also examined the alternative explanation that our results on interaction 
effects could be due to spurious effects caused by an interaction between dependence 
and perceived rule adequacy. When we added the interaction between dependence and 
perceived rule adequacy to Model 2, 3, or 4, this interaction was not significant. 
Moreover, the statistical significance level of our hypothesised interactions remained 
unchanged (not tabulated). 
Post-hoc Analysis: Non-Microsoft Subsample 
Given the high share of complementors stating Microsoft as their most important 
platform owner, we performed a post-hoc analysis to explore how the results change if 
Microsoft complementors are removed from the analysis. To this end, we estimated a 
Heckman selection model, wherein the treatment model relied on data only from those 
complementors that did not state Microsoft as their most important platform owner. The 
results are shown in Appendix C. Unlike in the full sample, perceived benevolence had 
a significant positive association with dedication in this sample (see Model 5 in 
Appendix C, ß=0.48, p<0.001). All other findings related to our hypotheses were 
unchanged in terms of statistical significance. In particular, perceived rule adequacy had 
a significant positive, although slightly weaker, association with dedication (ß=0.14, 
p<0.05). Moreover, as in the full sample, the three-way interaction between perceived 
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rule adequacy, perceived flexibility, and perceived benevolence was positive and 
significant (ß=0.09, p<0.001). 
Discussion 
Figure 3 presents plots of our interaction effect to facilitate their in-depth analysis and 
to illustrate the importance of the interaction effects3. The plot illustrates the interaction 
effects, with low (high) values referring to values that are 1.5 standard deviations below 
(above) the sample mean. Regarding these interaction effects, two observations are 
noteworthy: the slopes of the lines and the absolute values of complementor dedication. 
The steeper a positive slope, the stronger perceived rule adequacy contributes to 
complementor dedication. In this regard, the line referring to high benevolence and high 
flexibility in practising rules (see the black line with triangles in Figure 3) shows the 
steepest slope. This illustrates that high perceived rule adequacy contributes the 
strongest to complementor dedication when complementors perceived the rule practices 
to be both flexible and benevolent (predicted in H3c). Interestingly, the line referring to 
low benevolence and low flexibility also shows a positive slope (see the grey line with 
squares). This indicates that high rule adequacy can translate into higher dedication 
when both perceived flexibility and perceived benevolence of practising rules are low, 
although the relationship is not as strong as when both are high. 
Conversely, high rule adequacy hardly contributes to dedication when 
benevolence is high and flexibility is low, as indicated by the relatively flat slopes (see 
the grey line with triangles). Moreover, high rule adequacy does not contribute to 
 
3 Although the effect size of interaction effects is commonly indicated by R2 values (Carte and Russell, 
2003), our use of maximum-likelihood estimation prevents us for using R2 as an indicator of effect size 
(Greene, 2012, pp. 524-536). We therefore rely on interaction plots to illustrate the importance of 
interaction effects. 
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dedication when benevolence is low and flexibility is high, as shown by the relatively 
flat and even negative slope of the black line with squares. 
Overall, the stark contrast between the four slopes (ranging from steep positive 
to slightly negative slopes) underlines the importance of the three-way interaction. Thus 
the benefits perceived rule adequacy vary strongly depending on the extent to which 
rules are perceived to be practised with flexibility and benevolence. 
 
Figure 3: Interaction Plots 
With regards to absolute values, the interaction plot shows that complementor 
dedication is highest when the complementors perceive the rules as highly adequate and 
the rule practices as both highly flexible and highly benevolent (predicted standardised 
complementor dedication value of 0.56; see the black triangle in the upper right-hand 
area of the interaction plot). Importantly, this value is higher than the values predicted 
when either of the three governance dimensions is low (as predicted in H3a and H3b). It 
is also insightful to note that complementor dedication is always below the sample mean 
(i.e., standardised values below 0) when perceived rule adequacy is low (see the values 
in the left-hand part of the plot). For instance, complementors are substantially less 
dedicated when they perceive the rule practices as being both highly flexible and highly 
benevolent but perceive the rules themselves as barely adequate (predicted 
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complementor dedication value of -1.01; see the black triangle in the lower left-hand 
area of the interaction plot). This emphasises the critical role of perceived rule 
adequacy, as argued in H1. The absolute values depicted in Figure 3 also show that our 
three predictors, and their interaction, explain important variance of dedication beyond 
of what is explained by control variables, with predicted standardised values for 
dedication ranging from -1.01 to 0.56 for high versus low levels of our three predictors. 
In sum, our analysis of interaction effects generally supports the idea of 
complementary interactions between rule adequacy and benevolent and flexible rule 
practices. However, this interplay is more complicated than expected: We find no 
support for main effects of flexible practices (H2a) or benevolent practices (H2b) and 
no support for their two-way interactions (i.e., H3a and H3b). Moreover, we find that 
the benefits from an increase in rule adequacy are indeed strongest when rules are 
practised with high benevolence and high flexibility—confirming H3c. However, 
another feasible strategy for leveraging adequate rules is to practice them with high 
rigidity, i.e., neither with flexibility nor with benevolence. 
Our post-hoc analysis using the subsample of Non-Microsoft complementors 
adds two insights to this discussion. First, perceived rule adequacy and its three-way 
interaction with perceived flexibility and perceived benevolence predict dedication even 
if Microsoft complementors are removed from the sample. This indicates that key 
findings are not an artefact of the dominant role of Microsoft in our sample. Second, 
while the effect of perceived rule adequacy was somewhat weaker in the Non-Microsoft 
sample than in the full sample, the effect of perceived benevolence in practising rules 
was stronger and statistically significant in the Non-Microsoft sample. This suggests 
that the dedication may depend on a different degree on perceived rule adequacy and 
perceived benevolence depending on characteristics of the platform. 
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Contributions and Implications 
This study theorised and tested how rule adequacy and the way in which these rules are 
practised independently and jointly explain the dedication of complementors to a 
platform owner. As part of our theorising, we adapted established concepts from the 
governance literature to the context of platform ecosystems and therefore extended the 
applicability of traditional dyadic governance concepts to contemporary inter-
organisational arrangements with a one-to-many structure (Hong, et al., 2014). Our 
theory contextualisation provided the stage to develop six hypotheses on the 
independent and symbiotic effects of rule adequacy and rule practices on complementor 
dedication, which we tested using survey data from 181 platform partnerships. We find 
that rule adequacy independently strengthens complementor dedication and that this 
relationship is strongest when rule practices are simultaneously benevolent and flexible 
in contrast to being either benevolent or flexible. We also find that another effective 
strategy for leveraging adequate rules is to be highly rigid, i.e., to practice rules with 
low flexibility and low benevolence. These findings have important implications for 
qualitative and quantitative research on platform governance and the broader 
governance literature. 
Theoretical Contributions 
The overarching contribution of this study is the provision of a fine-grained 
understanding of governance-based complementor dedication. More specifically, our 
study explains variation in complementor dedication by analysing the independent and 
joint effects of governance design (captured as rule adequacy) and practices (captured 
as flexible and benevolent rule practices). This fine-grained understanding extends prior 
research on platform governance in three respects. 
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First, by introducing complementor dedication as a governance objective, we 
extend prior platform governance research that primarily sought to explain the sheer 
numbers of complementors or complements (McIntyre and Srinivasan, 2017). While we 
do not contest the importance of understanding why complementors join platforms 
(Economides and Katsamakas, 2006; Huang, et al., 2013; Kude, et al., 2012), introduce 
new software complements (Boudreau, 2012; Boudreau and Jeppesen, 2015; Cennamo 
and Santalo, 2013; Song et al., 2017), or abandon platforms (Tiwana, 2015; Zhu and 
Liu, 2018), we also note that prior platform governance research has been criticised for 
black-boxing other vital attributes of platform owner-complementor relationships 
(McIntyre and Srinivasan, 2017). Our dependent variable, complementor dedication, 
addresses this issue by capturing variation in what the highly autonomous 
complementors do once they have joined a platform by focusing on their devotion and 
faithfulness to this platform as well as their willingness to invest in it. 
Second, by identifying a significant positive association between rule adequacy 
and complementor dedication, our study is the first quantitative-confirmative study to 
integrate a central finding of recent qualitative-exploratory research on platform 
governance: in designing standardised rules, influential international platform owners 
should not only strive for standardisation but also be sensitive to the needs of the 
comparatively small complementors (Foerderer, et al., 2019; Huber, et al., 2017; Sarker, 
Xiao, et al., 2012; Wareham, et al., 2014). This extends prior quantitative research on 
platform governance by incorporating the, with few exceptions (e.g., Altman, 2016; 
Rickmann et al., 2014; Schreieck et al., 2019), overlooked perspective of 
complementors in the design calculus of effective platform governance (McIntyre and 
Srinivasan, 2017). Beyond that, our concept of rule adequacy extends prior qualitative-
exploratory work by elaborating the exact properties of complementor-sensitive rules 
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through a comprehensive content analysis of the rules in eight major platform 
ecosystems. This content analysis revealed that complementor-sensitive rules have the 
following properties: They have mechanisms that serve the three functions of 
protection, prevention, and promise. This also contributes to prior research that has 
investigated an alternative governance strategy to be sensitive to the needs of 
complementors: To grant complementors with high degrees of freedom, sometimes to 
the extent that platform owners open the core platform resources allowing them to adapt 
the platform itself (Karhu et al., 2018). This, however, bears the danger of promoting 
forking, which can be seen as an extreme form of undedicated complementor behaviour 
(Karhu, et al., 2018). Our findings suggest that an effective governance strategy that 
circumvents such undesirable behaviours but is still complementor-sensitive is to design 
rules with strong protections and safeguards for complementors and then show 
flexibility situationally—rather than to grant unlimited freedom. 
Third, the significant positive three-way interaction quantitatively underscores 
what qualitative research has previously hinted at: platform owners need to show 
flexibility and goodwill towards their complementors by engaging in dyadic-level 
variations in rule performances (Foerderer, et al., 2019; Huber, et al., 2017; Sarker, 
Xiao, et al., 2012; Wareham, et al., 2014). Our findings extend the idea of variation in 
rule performances with an understanding of the exact and complex relationship between 
such practice variation and rule design. More specifically, we found that neither 
flexibility nor benevolence does have significant main effects on complementor 
dedication (H2a and H2b not supported); they only affect dedication in conjunction with 
rule adequacy (H3c confirmed). In doing so, our findings oppose the idea of flexibility 
and benevolence as alternatives to adequate rules and favour instead of the idea of rule 
design and practices as a system of interlocked choices: Flexible and benevolent rule 
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practices cannot compensate for the adverse effects of inadequate rules. Instead, such 
practices are only useful in promoting dedication if they build on adequate rules. 
Moreover, our findings on flexible and benevolent rule practices resonate with the idea 
of rewarding successful complementors through selective promotion (Rietveld et al., 
2019). This research has investigated the antecedents of selectively promoting 
individual complementors. Hence, our analysis of the consequences of flexible and 
benevolent rule practices fruitfully complements this research. 
As a second contribution, our findings on the symbiotic interplay of rule design 
and rule practices bear important implications for the broader governance literature 
outside the context of platform ecosystems. In other contexts, such as IS outsourcing, 
mechanisms aimed at benevolence and flexibility were shown to have both positive 
main and two-way interaction effects (Gopal and Koka, 2012; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; 
Tiwana, 2009). This suggests that in contexts other than platform ecosystem flexibility 
and benevolence are beneficial irrespective of the characteristics of the situations, i.e., 
in situations in which other types of governance mechanisms such as contracts are weak 
(due to the main effects of flexibility or benevolence), in situations in which those 
mechanisms are strong (due to the two-way interaction effects), and irrespective of 
whether benevolence and flexibility are combined or occur in isolation. Our findings 
unveil that this differs considerably in the context of platform ecosystems: In our full 
sample, flexibility and benevolence did neither exert positive main effects nor did they 
interact with other types of governance in simple two-way interactions. Instead, our 
findings suggest that flexibility and benevolence are only valuable strategies if the other 
type of governance mechanism is of high quality (i.e., when rule adequacy is high). 
Thus, while in other inter-organisational contexts, higher levels of either flexibility or 
benevolence are effective governance strategies, such middle-ground solutions may not 
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suffice in platform ecosystems. Even highly rigid governance practices—i.e. when both 
flexibility and benevolence are absent—are preferable over governance practices that 
are either one or the other (but not both). A potential explanation for this three-way 
interaction could be that only platform owners that are both flexible and benevolent can 
simultaneously respond to unforeseen circumstances and demonstrate their commitment 
to the broader relational values that govern these relationships (Gulati, et al., 2012; 
Tiwana, et al., 2010). 
As a final contribution, our findings add to the longstanding complements versus 
substitutes debate in the governance literature (Carson, et al., 2003; Goo, et al., 2009; 
Huber, et al., 2013; Poppo, 1995; Tiwana, 2010). In the context of platform ecosystems, 
prior research implicitly took a substitutional view by arguing that sophisticated 
standards enable platform owners to orchestrate large ecosystems while keeping 
complementors at arm’s length (Parker and van Alstyne, 2008; Wareham, et al., 2014), 
which obviates the need for flexible and benevolent relational practices. Our finding, 
that one surprisingly effective strategy is to design highly adequate rules and to practice 
these rules with high rigidity lends support to this perspective. However, our findings on 
the positive three-way interaction even more strongly support the competing 
complementarity perspective, i.e., that the effects of standards can be strengthened 
through flexible and benevolent relational practices. Thus, we show that in the context 
of platform ecosystems, different governance mechanism can be both complements and 
substitutes. 
Endogeneity Threats 
A validity threat in any cross-sectional correlation research such as ours is endogeneity. 
In our context, endogeneity may result from self-selection of the complementors into 
platform ecosystems. Although it is difficult to dispel this potential threat entirely, three 
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aspects of our study substantially attenuate endogeneity concerns. First, we included 
several, in part highly significant, control variables (e.g. dependence, partnership age, 
partner manager, and complementor size) to account for the fact that different 
complementors could tolerate different values of perceived rule adequacy before they 
switch platforms. Since self-selection bias can be conceived as an omitted variables 
problem (Heckman, 1979), controlling for the variables that affect self-selection is an 
effective strategy for reducing endogeneity. Second, given the difficulties of controlling 
for all factors that could potentially affect platform selection, we used Heckman 
regression to address the selection bias that is due to factors not included in our list of 
control variables. The highly significant exclusion restrictions and the significant Wald 
test indicate that our Heckman correction is working. Third, although self-selection may 
operate to some extent in platform ecosystems, it operates at relatively low speed. The 
average partnership age in our sample was 11 years, indicating that complementors do 
not frequently revert their platform choices in response to their perceptions of 
governance (which would present an endogeneity problem). The tendency to stick to a 
platform for a long time might be explained by the substantial investments that are 
typically required to enter and benefit from a partnership with a platform owner. 
In light of these three aspects of our study, it is unlikely that our key findings are 
artefacts of endogeneity problems. 
Future Research and Limitations 
Our study opens up several avenues for future research, some of which result from the 
limitations of our study. First, although we are using an extensive list of control 
variables and Heckman correction to address endogeneity, we cannot entirely dispel 
endogeneity concerns. Future research could rely on longitudinal or quasi-experimental 
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methods to ascertain the causal effects indicated by our data. 
Second, although our sample includes a variety of platform ecosystems with 
differing characteristics, we do not theorise or examine how platform characteristics 
affect the relationships investigated in our study. Indeed, some governance mechanisms 
might be more critical on some platforms than on others, as indicated by our finding 
that the effect of perceived rule adequacy was somewhat weaker in the Non-Microsoft 
sample while the effect of perceived benevolence in practising rules was stronger and 
statistically significant in the Non-Microsoft sample. As with Constantinides et al. 
(2018) we, therefore, recommend that future research investigate how the relationship 
between governance and dedication differs depending on the characteristics of the 
platforms. 
Third, closely related to this is the unanswered question about the causes of 
different perceptions of rules by complementors. Future research may examine how 
different properties of rules interplay with other factors (e.g. the platform architecture, 
technological change) affecting the perceptions of these rules. Such research may 
consider how dynamic changes in platforms (e.g. in terms of its architecture or feature 
set) may require follow-up governance adaptations. For example, it was shown that 
platforms that undergo generational transitions might harm the ability of complementors 
to sustain their superior performances (Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017). Consequently, one 
may ask how platform governance should be adapted so that complementors can see a 
generational transition as an opportunity rather than a threat. 
Fourth, although our results suggest that platform owners could maximise value 
co-creation by situationally practising rules with flexibility and benevolence, we still 
know little about when and how exactly they should do so. In this regard, future 
qualitative research should provide more fine-grained insights. 
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Fifth, our study assumes that governing towards higher dyadic-level 
complementor dedication is per se desirable. However, we do not look at potentially 
adverse effects of dyadic-level flexibility and benevolence for the ecosystem as a whole. 
As an example, flexibility and benevolence in favour of one individual complementor 
may lead to envy and resentment among other complementors that do not receive 
similar preferential treatment. Therefore, future research should take a closer look at the 
possible “dark side” of flexible and benevolent rule practices for entire ecosystems. 
Managerial Implications 
Dedicated complementors are a critical factor in differentiating the ecosystem from 
those of its competitors. Our study provides two pieces of advice for nurturing 
complementor dedication. First, platform owners should heavily invest in designing 
adequate rules by stipulating sophisticated mechanisms that serve three distinct 
functions (i.e., protect, prevent, promise). For example, platform owners should design 
rules that ensure valuable benefits with high legal certainty to their complementors. Due 
to the strong positive main effect of rule adequacy, such investments are likely to 
always pay off in the form of complementor dedication. Our second piece of advice 
pertains to the flexibility and benevolence with which platform owners should practice 
rules. Here, our advice is that platform owners should only adapt governance practices 
to the needs of individual complementors if they strive for particularly high levels of 
complementor dedication and are confident that their rules are perceived to be adequate. 
If this is the case, practice variations will allow platform owners to elevate 
complementor dedication to the highest level. If this is not the case, platform owners 
should play it safe and practice the rules with high rigidity. 
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Appendix A: Construct Measures 
The constructs used were embedded in an industry-wide survey with a particular focus 
on partnerships in the software industry. First, the respondents were asked to complete 
questions about the nature of their company (e.g., standard software manufacturer, 
custom software manufacturer, software integrator, etc.) and operating numbers (e.g., 
revenue, R&D expenditures, number of employees, etc.). Second, software partnerships 
were defined. Third, the respondents were asked to identify all the platform owners they 
maintain partnerships. Fourth, the respondents were asked to identify the most 
important platform owner among the previously listed. The name of the most important 
platform owner subsequently replaced the term platform owner in the measurements. 
All independent and dependent constructs used multi-item five-point Likert measures, 
from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’. 
Independent Variables 
Table 9: Perceived Rule Adequacy 
Definition: The extent to which complementors perceive the ecosystem-wide rules to secure 
their own interests as opposed to only securing the interests of the platform 
owner. 
Measures Measured through three items based on a 5-point Likert scale: 
The rules of conduct in the partner network (e.g., standard partnership 
agreement, guidelines, code of conduct) … 
...protect the interests of our company vis-à-
vis platform owner. 
Based on Child, et al. (2003); 
Gefen and Pavlou (2012) 
Contextualised with Huber, et 
al. (2017); Tiwana, et al. 
(2010); Wareham, et al. (2014) 
...prevent inappropriate behaviour on the part 
of the platform owner. 
Based on Child, et al. (2003); 
Gefen and Pavlou (2012) 
Contextualised with Huber, et 
al. (2017); Tiwana, et al. 
(2010); Wareham, et al. (2014) 
...ensure that our company will receive the 
promised partnership benefits from the 
platform owner. 
Based on Child, et al. (2003); 
Gefen and Pavlou (2012) 
Contextualised with Huber, et 
al. (2017); Tiwana, et al. 
(2010); Wareham, et al. (2014) 
Cronbach’s α: 0.850 
CR: 0.910 
AVE: 0.771 
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Table 10: Perceived Flexibility in Practising Rules 
Definition: The extent to which complementors perceive the enactment of ecosystem-wide 
rules (e.g., rules, codes of conduct, or partnership charters) by the platform 
owner as responsive. 
Measures: 
 
Measured through three items based on a 5-point Likert scale: 
The rules of conduct of the partner network (e.g., standard partnership 
agreement, guidelines, code of conduct)... 
…are interpreted flexibly. 
 
Based on Boyle, et al. (1992); 
Heide and John (1992) 
Contextualised with Huber, et 
al. (2017); Wareham, et al. 
(2014) 
…are handled as needed in a given situation. Based on Boyle, et al. (1992); 
Heide and John (1992) 
Contextualised with Huber, et 
al. (2017); Wareham, et al. 
(2014) 
…allow room for interpretation. 
 
Based on Boyle, et al. (1992); 
Heide and John (1992) 
Contextualised with Huber, et 
al. (2017); Wareham, et al. 
(2014) 
Cronbach’s α: 0.886 
CR: 0.929 
AVE: 0.814 
 
Table 11: Perceived Benevolence in Practising Rules 
Definition: The extent to which complementors perceive the enactment of ecosystem-wide 
rules (e.g., rules, codes of conduct, or partnership charters) by the platform 
owner as kind and generous. 
Measures: Measured through three items based on a 5-point Likert scale: 
The interpretation of the rules of conduct in the partner network (e.g., standard 
partnership agreement, guidelines, code of conduct) is always … 
…in the interest of our partnership. Based on McKnight, et al. 
(2002) 
Contextualised with Huber, et 
al. (2017); Wareham, et al. 
(2014) 
…in favour of our partnership. 
 
Based on McKnight, et al. 
(2002) 
Contextualised with Huber, et 
al. (2017); Wareham, et al. 
(2014) 
…beneficial to our partnership. 
 
Based on McKnight, et al. 
(2002) 
Contextualised with Huber, et 
al. (2017); Wareham, et al. 
(2014) 
Cronbach’s α: 0.897 
CR: 0.935 
AVE: 0.829 
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Dependent Variable 
Table 12: Complementor Dedication 
Definition: The degree to which a complementor is devoted, faithful, and willing to invest 
in the partnership with a platform owner. 
Measures: 
 
Measured through four items based on a 5-point Likert scale: 
Our company intends to… 
...intensify its partnership with platform 
owner. 
Based on Anderson (1985); 
Heide and John (1992) 
Contextualised with Tiwana 
(2015) 
...intensify existing personal contacts with 
employees of the platform owner. 
Based on Anderson (1985); 
Heide and John (1992) 
Contextualised with Tiwana 
(2015) 
...establish new personal contacts with 
employees of the platform owner. 
Based on Anderson (1985); 
Heide and John (1992) 
Contextualised with Tiwana 
(2015) 
...acquire additional certificates from platform 
owner. 
Based on Anderson (1985); 
Heide and John (1992) 
Contextualised with Tiwana 
(2015) 
Cronbach’s α: 0.886 
CR: 0.922 
AVE: 0.749 
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Control Variables 
Table 13: Control Variables  
Variable: Measures: Relevance: References: 
Partnership 
Age: 
The number of years the complementor was in a partnership with the 
platform owner. 
Complementors might be mainly dedicated in the first few years of a partnership, when 
they establish personal contacts and invest in resources, suggesting a negative 
relationship between relationship age and dedication. Relationship age might also 
explain platform choice (i.e., self-selection into a platform) given that complementors 
may find it more difficult to switch their platform after they have made significant 
investments into the platform over a more extended period. 
Based on Lee and Kim 
(1999), Tiwana (2015), and 
Ring and van de Ven (1994), 
contextualised to reflect our 
particular context. 
Partner 
Manager: 
1 if the complementor was assigned a partner manager; 0 otherwise 
Complementors might be more dedicated when they are assigned a dedicated partner 
manager (in contrast to being randomly assigned members of a partner management 
organisation). Moreover, having a partner manager may also explain platform choice 
because complementors having a partner manager might be more inclined to stay in a 
platform with unfavourable governance (e.g. low perceived rule adequacy) than 
complementors without a partner manager. 
Based on Huber, et al. 
(2017), contextualised to 
reflect our particular context. 
Complementor 
Size: 
The count of full time employed equivalents in 
Switzerland (logarithmic transformation) 
Larger complementors are more likely to create significant co-creation opportunities 
that make platform owners willing to vary rule practices. Moreover, complementors 
size might affect platform choice given that some platforms (e.g. mobile app platforms) 
might be more amenable for small complementors than others (e.g. enterprise software 
platforms). 
Based on Roberts and 
Grover (2012), 
contextualised to reflect our 
particular context. 
Multi-homing 
(seller-level): 
1 if the complementor complements platforms of more 
than one platform owner; 0 otherwise 
Multi-homing complementors might be less dedicated to a focal platform because they 
spread their efforts across platforms. Moreover, multi-homing may explain platform 
choice given that multi-homing might be easier to implement on some platforms (e.g. 
mobile app platforms) than on others (e.g. enterprise software platforms, where apps 
might be specific to the platform owner’s enterprise software). Mover, complementors 
relying on multi-homing might be more inclined to stay at a platform despite 
unfavourable governance (e.g. low perceived rule adequacy). 
Based on Bakos and 
Katsamakas (2008); Choi 
(2010); Landsman and 
Stremersch (2011); Mantena 
and Saha (2012); Tiwana 
(2015), contextualised to 
reflect our particular context. 
Software 
Integrator: 
1 if the primary business purpose of a complementor is software 
integration; 0 otherwise 
Being a software integrator might explain platform selection because software 
integrators might find it easier than software product companies to switch platforms 
given that software integrators will typically not face the same sunk costs for giving up 
or migrating existing software solutions. 
Based on Brusoni and 
Prencipe (2001), 
contextualised to reflect our 
particular context. 
Same Layer: 
1 if the complement and the platform reside on the 
same layer (application software layer, middleware layer, systems 
software layer); 0 otherwise 
Complementors that reside on the same layers in the software stack as the platform may 
generate higher value, thus fostering complementor dedication. 
Based on Gao and Iyer 
(2009); Kude, et al. (2012), 
contextualised to reflect our 
particular context. 
Dependence: 
Our company… 
More dependent complementors may be more dedicated. Moreover, dependence may 
explain platform selection given that more dependent complementors are more likely to 
stay in an ecosystem when they perceive governance to be unfavourable (e.g. low 
perceived rule adequacy). 
Based on Ganesan (1994), 
Lee and Kim (1999) Lusch 
and Brown (1996), 
Noordewier et al. (1990), 
and Rao et al. (2007), 
contextualised to reflect our 
particular context. 
...is dependent on platform owner. 
...has no good alternative to the platform owner. 
...would have difficulty in replacing platform owner. 
...would have difficulty achieving its own goals in the event of the 
dissolution of the partnership with platform owner. 
Cronbach’s α:  0.846 
CR:  0.894 
AVE:  0.678 
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Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics 
Table 14: Platform owners4 that our respondents named as most important for them 
 Microsoft Oracle Apple IBM SAP Google Adobe Other 
Number of mentions: 76 14 11 11 10 5 4 50 
 
Table 15: Number of complemented platform owners (≠ platforms) 
 1 2 3 4 more than 4 
Number of mentions: 88 40 29 14 10 
 
Table 16: Industry focus of complementors 
 Industry Specific Industry Unspecific Both Industry Specific and Unspecific  
Number of 
Mentions: 
48 58 75 
 
  
 
4 Platform owners may provide multiple platforms. For example, Microsoft not only provides an 
operating system (e.g., Windows 10) and an office suite (e.g., Microsoft Office 365), but also server and 
development platforms (e.g., Sharepoint,.NET, Exchange Server) or cloud platforms (e.g., Azure). 
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Appendix C: Supplementary Regression Results 
Table 17: Regression Result in the Sample without Microsoft Complementors 
 
Model 5 
Controls and Main Effects, 
Excluding Microsoft 
Complementors 
Model 6 
+Two-way and Three-way Interaction 
Effects, Excluding Microsoft Complementors 
Treatment Model   
Intercept .32 (40) .30 (.47) 
No. of Employees -.01 (.08) .02 (.09) 
Multi-homing -.30* (.14) -.28 (.14) 
Softw. Integrator .17 (.16) .19 (.17) 
Partner Manager .34* (.15) .35** (.12) 
Relationship age .05 (.08) .05 (.07) 
Same Layer .31* (.15) .27 (.15) 
Dependence .35*** (.07) .36*** (.10) 
Rule Adequacy .14* (.06) .14** (.04) 
Flexibility -.21 (.13) -.25* (.11) 
Benevolence .48*** (.07) .38*** (.07) 
Rule Adequacy × Flexibility - .00 (.06) 
Rule Adequacy × Benevolence - .02 (.05) 
Flexibility × Benevolence - -.04 (.08) 
Rule Adequacy × Flexibility × 
Benevolence 
- .09*** (.02) 
Selection Model   
Intercept .00 (.67) -.05 (.74) 
Specific Sector -.52*** (.14) -.56*** (.13) 
Public Administration -.44*** (.10) -.42*** (.11) 
Enterprise Content Management -.40*** (.10) -.39*** (.11) 
No. of Employees -.09 (.12) -.08 (.09) 
Multi-homing .77*** (.12) .70*** (.11) 
Softw. Integrator -.03 (.14) .01 (.14) 
Partner Manager .51** (.17) .53*** (.15) 
Relationship age .00 (.14) .00 (.14) 
Same Layer .02 (.13) .04 (.10) 
Dependence -.25** (.10) -.27** (.10) 
Rule Adequacy -.12* (.06) -.10* (.05) 
Flexibility .21* (.11) .23 (.12) 
Benevolence -.17 (.07) -.20** (.06) 
Rule Adequacy × Flexibility - .13* (.05) 
Rule Adequacy × Benevolence - -.01 (.06) 
Flexibility × Benevolence - .06 (.06) 
Rule Adequacy × Flexibility × 
Benevolence 
- .00 (.04) 
Log likelihood -218.19 -212.73 
Wald test of independent equations: 
Chi-squared 
7.86*** 24.81*** 
*p <.05, **p <.01, ***p <.001, n = 181, thereof 105 selected and 76 nonselected (Microsoft complementors) Heckman selection 
regression with cluster-robust standard errors (cluster: platform owner), all non-binary variables standardised 
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Appendix D: Coding Examples 
Table 18: Identified rule mechanisms 
Function Mechanisms Sample Text Passages From Analysed Documents 
Protection of 
complementor 
resources 
Intellectual 
property 
protection 
“It is against Oracle policy to use, copy, display, or distribute third party 
copyrighted software, documentation, or other materials without permission or 
approval from Oracle’s Legal Department.” (Oracle Code of Ethics and Business 
Conduct) 
 “[…] [We] respect the intellectual property rights of others. Inappropriate use of 
others’ intellectual property may expose Google… to criminal and civil fines and 
penalties.” (Google Code of Conduct) 
Confidentiality 
protection 
“We [Microsoft] respect the confidentiality […] rights of others, and do not use 
others’ confidential information without authorisation.” (Microsoft Standards of 
Business Conduct) 
“Confidential Information must not be used or reproduced in any form except as 
required to accomplish the intent of this agreement.” (SAP PartnerEdge GTCs) 
Privacy protection 
“If you provide Oracle with personal information concerning your customers, 
prospects or employees, Oracle will only use the information in manners consistent 
with those specified in this agreement […].” (Oracle Partner Network Agreement) 
“Without limiting the previous, each party will not use or share Personal Data 
received from the other party (or its customers) for a purpose for which it has not 
obtained consent […]” (Microsoft Partner Network Agreement) 
 
 
Prevention of 
inappropriate 
platform owner 
behaviour 
 
 
 
 
Prevention of 
inappropriate 
platform owner 
behaviour 
Interference 
prevention 
“Nothing in this agreement restricts a party from (1) working with and using third 
party technologies; or (2) independently developing or acquiring new products or 
services, improving existing products or services, or marketing any new, improved, 
or existing products or services.” (Microsoft Partner Network Agreement) 
 “Partner acts in its name, at its own risk and for its account for the performance of 
any activities arising under any part of this agreement. The parties are therefore 
independent contractors and do not act as agents or representatives of each other.” 
(SAP PartnerEdge GTCs) 
Liability 
prevention 
“If a third party asserts a claim against you that an IBM Product IBM provides to 
you under this agreement infringes that party's patent or copyright, IBM will defend 
you against that claim at IBM’s expense […]” (IBM Business Partner agreement) 
 “If a third party claims that any programme [platform] infringes its intellectual 
property rights based on your authorised use of the programmes in accordance with 
the terms of this agreement, Oracle will indemnify you against the claim […] ” 
(Oracle Partner Network Agreement) 
Promise of 
partnership 
benefits 
Promise of 
commercial 
resources 
“SAP provides sales tools, services, and activities designed to accelerate the sales 
cycle.” (SAP PartnerEdge Programme Guide) 
“The Microsoft Partner Network (the “MPN”) gives you access to (1) Microsoft 
content, information, sales tools, documentation, branding materials such as logos, 
and resources (the “Microsoft Materials”) […]” (Microsoft Partner Network 
Agreement) 
Promise of 
technical 
resources 
“The community-level guides companies establishing a technology relationship with 
Adobe. Partners at this level have access to SDKs via our Developer Portal so they 
can learn about our products and APIs” (Adobe Partner Programme Guide) 
“SAP currently offers a variety of training classes, consulting packages, and 
development tools to help you navigate the technical requirements of developing 
solutions that seamlessly integrate with SAP solutions.” (SAP PartnerEdge 
Programme Guide) 
 
